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NOTES
SYMPATHY STRIKES AND FEDERAL COURT INJUNCTIONS
The collective bargaining agreement between the United Steelwor-
kers and the Buffalo Forge Company contained a broad arbitration clause
and a "no strike" clause. Non-plant workers of the company, who were
not covered by the agreement, picketed, and union members refused to
cross the picket line. The employer sued in federal court to enjoin the
sympathy strike pending arbitration on the basis of Boys Markets, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Local 770.' Affirming the lower court's denial of the
injunction, 2 the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court
injunction of a strike will issue only when the strike is intended to subvert
the arbitration process in contravention of a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Buffalo Forge Company v. United Steelworkers of America, 96 S.
Ct. 3141 (1976).
Early organizational efforts by labor unions were often irreparably
damaged by the disheartening effect of quick injunctions granted by
federal courts as the budding unions began to flex their economic muscle
by striking.3 This interference by federal courts became so commonplace
by the 1930's 4 that Congress responded with the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 5
The provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act were intended, in part, to
remedy hindrance to initial growth by prohibiting strike injunctions by
federal courts altogether. 6 However, as time passed the conflicts of man-
agement and labor became more and more refined and remote from the
I. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
2. 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975); 386 F. Supp. 405 (W.D. N.Y. 1974).
3. H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 20 (1950).
See also Anderson, Disadvantages of Injunctions in Industrial Disputes, 1975
N.Z.L.J. 179, 179-80 (1975).
4. See I. BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS 195-205 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
BERNSTEIN].
5. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1932) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
(1932), provides in part: "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to
issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case
involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons
participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined)
from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts: (a.) ceasing
or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation or employment .
6. BERNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 391-415.
NOTES
initial employee organizational and representational problems addressed
by the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
7
One indication of this refinement came in 1960 when the United
States Supreme Court, in a series of cases widely known as the Steelwor-
kers' Trilogy, 8 developed a judicial policy favoring the submission of
disputes to arbitration in preference to taking judicial action to enforce
collective bargaining agreements. 9 This policy greatly influenced the Su-
preme Court's subsequent examination of the scope of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act's prohibition of strike injunctions by federal courts.
Two Supreme Court cases concerning employers' attempts in federal
courts to specifically enforce contractual "no strike" clauses illustrate the
difficulty of accommodating the Norris-LaGuardia Act's policy of refrain-
ing from court intervention in labor-management disputes with the policy
of fostering agreements to arbitrate. In Sinclair Refinery Company v.
Atkinson' ° the Supreme Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act's pro-
hibition against federal court injunction of strikes even extended to those
cases where a union had expressly agreed not to strike and to arbitrate all
disputes, but nevertheless struck to enforce its grievance. In Avco Corpo-
ration v. Aero Lodge 735" the Supreme Court held that injunction
proceedings in state courts were removable to federal court for final
determination,' 2 in effect destroying all possibility for injunctive relief for
the employer in state as well as federal court.' 3 At this point the Court had
7. For example, with the passage of the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1947), Congress enacted detailed procedures for labor
organization certification, collective bargaining, and reciprocal employee-employer
protection of rights.
8. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564 (1960).
9. Contract enforcement in labor areas is available in federal court through
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1947), National Labor Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87
(1947), which provides: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce
as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may
be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties."
10. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
11. 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1948) (removal jurisdiction).
13. The Norris-LaGuardia Act itself did not address state court injunctions.
See the text of the act at note 5, supra.
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reached what has been termed a "self-created dilemma": 14 while having
announced a strong policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes, the
Supreme Court still refused to allow injunctions of employee strikes
specifically aimed at undermining arbitration by use of self-help measures.
Subsequently, in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770,15
the Supreme Court addressed this difficulty and recognized a particular
area where federal court injunctions of strikes would be allowed in defer-
ence to the national policy favoring the arbitration process rather than the
potentially disruptive self-help method of resolving grievances through
strikes. 16 For a federal court to enjoin a strike, three elements must be
present:17 the collective bargaining agreement must contain a mandatory
arbitration provision, there must be an agreement by the union not to
strike,18 and a subsequent strike by the union must be over an arbitrable
dispute, i.e., the union must have attempted to circumvent the contractual
arbitration process through the self-help measure of striking.
While the prerequisites for a federal strike injunction were an-
nounced, the extent to which the new exception to the Norris-LaGuardia
Act prohibition would specifically affect sympathy strikes' 9 was unclear,
and subsequent decisions in the circuit courts took two radically different
positions. Beginning with Monongahela Power Company v. IBEW Local
2332,2" one line of cases, reasoning that either the policy of arbitation was
superior to any Norris-LaGuardia restraints 2 or that any "no strike"
provision was arbitrable,22 held that sympathy strikes are circumventions
14. Abrams, The Labor Injunction and the Refusal to Cross Another Union's
Picket Line, 26 CASE W. L. REV. 178 (1975) (exhaustive case history analysis
of sympathy strike injunctions).
15. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
16. Id. at 250. The Norris-LaGuardia Act was distinguished as being aimed
at protection for employee organization in the formative stages of unionism
rather than at the mature contract stage where a labor organization had bargained
for the preference of arbitration to strikes.
17. Id. at 253-54.
18. In Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974), the Court held that an
agreement not to strike can be implied from a broad arbitration clause on the
basis of a "quid pro quo" promise by the union not to strike in consideration of
the employer's granting an arbitration clause. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
19. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2317 (1969): "Sym-
pathetic strike n: a strike in which the strikers make no demands on their own
employers but try to bring pressure against the employers of other workers on
strike-called also sympathy strike."
20. 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973).
21. Id. at 1212.
22. NAPA Pittsburg, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs, Local 926, 502 F.2d 321
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974). Interestingly, in this case the union
[Vol. 37
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of the arbitration process and, hence, enjoinable. 23 Another line of cases
maintained that a sympathy strike is not a circumvention of the arbitration
process because there is no showing that a union which is engaged in such
a strike is unwilling to arbitrate the subject matter of the dispute, and that
therefore sympathy strikes are not enjoinable. 24
In the instant case this latter line of reasoning prevailed as the
Supreme Court held that sympathy strikes are not directly aimed at a
circumvention of the aribtration process, and therefore do not fall within
the Boys Markets exception. 25 The collective bargaining agreement con-
tained a very broad arbitration clause 26 as well as an explicit agreement by
the union not to strike. 27 During a three day sympathy strike by the union
honoring a newly established co-worker bargaining unit's picket line the
company sought injunctive relief in federal district court pending arbitra-
tion of the legality of the sympathy strike .28
In affirming the district and appellate courts' denial of injunctive
relief under these circumstances, the Supreme Court clarified the underly-
ing theory of Boys Markets. Recognizing the importance of complying
had expressly reserved the right to respect primary picket lines of other unions.
In a subsequent sympathy strike the employer contested the "primary" status of
the picket line honored, claiming (successfully) that the status of the picket line
was an "arbitrable" matter, that the union was circumventing arbitration of the
dispute by honoring the picket line without initial arbitration, and, therefore,
that the sympathy strike was enjoinable on those grounds.
23. See also Valmac Indus., Inc. v. Food Handlers Local 425, 519 F.2d 263
(8th Cir. 1975); Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1974).
24. The initial decision in this line of cases was Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated
Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v.
Typographical Union No. 53, 520 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975); Hyster Co. v.
Independent Machine Ass'n, 519 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1975). A body of legal literature
arose supporting each of these diametrically opposed positions. Compare Dawson,
The Scope of the Boys Markets Rule, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 794 (1975) with
Abrams, supra note 14.
25. 96 S. Ct. 3141, 3147 (1976).
26. Id. at 3143: "Should differences arise between the [employer] and any
employee covered by this Agreement, as to the meaning and application of the
provisions of this Agreement, or should any trouble of any kind arise in the
plant, there shall be no suspension of work on account of such differences, but
an earnest effort shall be made to settle such differences immediately [under the
six-step grievance and arbitration procedure provided in the contract]" (emphasis
added).
27. Id. at n.I.
28. Under the Boys Markets holding an order to compel arbitration and the
employer's agreement to arbitrate forthwith are prerequisites to a strike injunction.
398 U.S. 235, 254 (1970).
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with the dictates of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 the Court emphasized that
the holding in Boys Markets was very "narrow" and designed solely to
frustrate union attempts at circumventing the arbitration process by self-
help measures. The Court reasoned that in a sympathy strike the essential
element of an attempted undermining of the arbitration process is not
present, and that to allow the injunction of such a strike would extend the
holding of Boys Markets beyond the fundamental policy reasons underly-
ing that decision."0 A vigorous dissent by Justice Stevens3t argued that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act was never intended to eliminate injunctions to
enforce contractual commitments to arbitrate grievances, and that the
Court had, in previous holdings, stipulated that injunctions were possible
even when the injunction was based solely on a contractual duty not to
strike. 32
Despite the dissent's position that the majority was departing from
previous holdings, the decision in Buffalo Forge Company was not sur-
prising. In Boys Markets, the Court recognized that its holding left open
the possibility of otherwise prohibited injunctive relief, and the Court even
foresaw that it would have to delimit the scope of the judicial exception to
the Norris-LaGuardia Act it had created.3 3 Nevertheless, a problem which
undoubtedly led to the conflict in the circuits over sympathy strike injunc-
tions was the confusion caused by the Boys Markets decision concerning
the relative merits of a national policy favoring arbitration and the express
dictates of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. While stating very broad policy
reasons favoring injunctions of self-help strikes circumventing arbitration
29. 96 S. Ct. at 3148. See the text at note 5, supra.
30. Id. The Court additionally stated that despite "quid pro quo" contractual
theories (see note 18, supra) federal courts can not enjoin a strike simply because it
violates a "no strike" clause. The Court reasoned that if injunctions
were obtainable on these grounds it would follow that an injunction would be
appropriate for every breach of contract accompanied by a broad arbitration
clause. See United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 582 (1959) (Court stated that "judicial inquiry under § 301 must be
strictly confined to the question whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate
the grievance. ... ).
31. The case was a 5-4 decision with Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Powell dissenting.
32. The dissent cited Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974) (see the
case discussion at note 18, supra) as supporting this proposition; however, the
majority distinguished Gateway Coal (where there was present a unilateral
enforcement of an underlying grievance by the union striking). 96 S. Ct. at
3147-48, n.10.
33. 398 U.S. at 253-54 (1970): "Nor does it follow from what we have said that
injunctive relief is appropriate as a matter of course in every case of a strike
over an arbitrable grievance."
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proceedings, the Court in Boys Markets repeatedly warned that its deci-
sion was a "narrow" one. This led at least one commentator to conclude
that the "narrowness" announced in that decision referred to enjoining
strikes in general where a union had agreed to a broad arbitration clause
rather than to enjoining strikes aimed at enforcing specific grievances.34
However, the instant case implies that the actual policy which formed
the basis of Boys Markets was one of disfavoring a circumvention of the
arbitration process rather than one generally favoring arbitration over
self-help measures. This position is perhaps more consistent with both the
literal dictates of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 35 and the Court's repeatedly
articulated policy of leaving the parties to a collective bargaining agree-
ment free to formulate and police their own contract.36 Enjoining a
sympathy strike which was originally contemplated by the union as allow-
able under the collective bargaining contract may have the effect of
enjoining a contractually "legal" activity as well as requiring the union to
arbitrate in areas where arbitration was not contemplated during contract
bargaining. If such an injunction has the effect of supplying an additional
unbargained-for term to the collective bargaining contract on behalf of the
employer, namely a greater duty by the union to arbitrate, then the federal
court has clearly exceeded the bounds of neutrality envisioned by the
framers of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Furthermore, such a very broad policy of enforced arbitration via
immediate injunction of sympathy strikes may not be completely realistic
given the nature of labor-management relations. The strike is the basic
economic weapon of the employee in the employment relation. While a
union may indeed bargain away the right to strike on its own behalf for
economic or other causes via a broad arbitration clause, a sympathy strike
may be directly related to the organizational efforts of another union, and
an injunction to stop this activity pending arbitration may impinge upon
the intervention-free environment sought by the Norris-LaGuardia Act far
more than an injunction to stop the unilateral enforcement of grievances
pending arbitration. While a sympathy strike may indeed be a contractual
violation, an injunction of an ultimately contractually permissible sym-
pathy strike would be much more of an interference than the injunction of
a strike to enforce a grievance, for in the latter case, regardless of the just
34. Dawson, supra note 24, at 806.
35. See the text of the act at note 5, supra.
36. See the discussion in note 30, supra.
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nature of the underlying grievance, the union has already agreed to settle
grievances by arbitration rather than by strike.
Clearly, the federal court policy of minimal interference is of little
comfort to the employer faced with a sympathy strike or strike of similarly
protected status 37 under the Norris-LaGuardia Act.3 8 However, still open
to the employer is the arbitrator's issuance of an injunction subsequent to
arbitration, 39 which has been a method of relief utilized by employers
subsequent to the Sinclair Refinery Company case.' Additionally, it is
clear that in cases where strikes aimed at undermining the arbitration
process are alleged or disguised to be sympathy strikes or similarly
protected strikes, federal courts can properly grant injunctive relief.41
C. John Caskey
37. It appears likely from the Court's decision that other strikes than sympathy
strikes are now within the Norris-LaGuardia Act's prohibition against
federal court injunctions, because the qualifying element of an injunction-free
strike is defined as one not circumventing arbitration through self-help measures.
Two examples of strikes possibly falling within this category are employee safety
protest strikes and politically inspired strikes by employees; however,
the Court made no specific mention of strikes falling within this category other
than sympathy strikes.
38. Although theoretically a forum open to the employer, injunctive relief in
state court cannot be realistically sought in light of the Avco Corporation rule.
See the text at note 11, supra for the rule allowing removal of injunction cases to
federal court where the Norris-LaGuardia Act's prohibition would come into
play.
39. See, e.g., Ruppert v. Egelhofer, 3 N.Y.2d 576, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785 (N.Y.
1958) (the arbitrator's award of injunctive relief was upheld in state court). The
United States Supreme Court has noted this practice. See Drake Bakeries, Inc. v.
Local 50, 370 U.S. 254, 260 n.5 (1962). An arbitrator's award of injunctive relief is
enforceable in federal court via § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. See
the text of the act at note 9, supra.
40. See, e.g., Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, 370 U.S. 254, 260 n.5 (1962)
(Supreme Court recognized this practice on the state level).
41. This conclusion is based on a logical extension of the Court's reasoning
and is supported, in part, by statements in the current legal literature in this
area. See, e.g., Axelrod, The Application of the Boys Markets Decision in the
Federal Courts, 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 893, 920, 929-30 (1975); Comment,
Federal Labor Policy and the Scope of the Prerequisites for a Boys Market
Injunction, 19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 328, 343-44 (1975).
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